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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
Samuel B. Chase, Jr., Great Falls; Walter C. Pope, Missoula,
and C. A. Blenkner, Columbus. This committee submits the
following report:
A questionnaire was mailed to all lawyers engaged in
active practice within the state, inquiring as to practice
opportunities and positions in law offices available to re-
turning lawyer-veterans. Approximately 200 replies were
received, many of which mentioned openings in communi-
ties or particular offices. A news story to the effect that
the information thus secured would be made available by
the committee chairman to any lawyer-veterans who de-
sired it was carried by the Associated Press and was pub-
lished by a number of newspapers throughout the state.
Since then many requests for information have been re-
ceived and the committee has assisted a number of veter-
ans in finding localities where there is a need for addition-
al lawyers. The committee will act as a clearing house for
practicing lawyers and returning veterans and it requests
that it be advised of practice opportunities as they arise.
Attorneys returning from the armed forces who have not
previously practiced law or who desire to reenter practice
in different localities are urged to contact the committee
chairman at 514 Electric Building, Billings.
The committee plans to cooperate with the Practicing
Law Institute and the American Bar Association Section
of Legal Education in making available to Montana vet-
erans refresher courses in General and Trial Practice, Fed-
eral Taxation, and Significant Developments in The Law
During the War Years. It is anticipated that extension
courses in these subjects will soon be made available to
veterans free of cost.
To aid former servicemen in getting clients, the com-
mittee respectfully requests district judges to name vet-
erans in cases which involve court-appointed lawyers. The
committee also urges lawyers to refer to veterans any work
they are unable to handle personally.
MAY A REAL ESTATE BROKER IN MONTANA COLLECT
A COMMISSION ORALLY PROMISED HIM?
At common law and under the usual Statute of Frauds,
it seems quite clear that while a contract for the actual sale
or purchase of land, where the agent or broker had authority
to receive or pass title, was required to be in writing, the rule
had no application to a mere contract of employment by which
one person was tn act as agent or broker for another in ne-
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gotiating a sale or purchase so as to defeat the rights of such
an agent or broker under parol authority to recover the agreed
compensation
In many jurisdictions, however, statutes have been en-
acted requiring contracts for employment of real estate brok-
ers to be reduced to writing which preclude recovery for serv-
ices rendered by the latter pursuant to an oral agreement, even
on a quantum meruit basis."
The reasons behind these statutes may be divided into two
broad classes; first, the traditional type of statute intending
to prevent fraud and confusion relating to title in land, and
second, the specialized type intending to prevent fraud or con-
fusion in contracts and commissions in relation to the securing
of parties interested in land, but not directly affecting the
title. The theory of this latter type of statutes! seems to be a
prevention of fraud and perjury in a field which has proved
excessively litigious.'
1AM. JUR., Brokers §160.
2AM. JuR., Brokers §161.
'Wis. Stat. 1925, §240.10.
"Every contract to pay a commission to a real estate agent or brok-
er or to any other person for selling or buying real estate or negotiat-
ing lease therefor for a term or terms exceeding a period of three
years shall be void unless such contract ...... describing such real
estate, expressing the price for which the same may be sold or pur-
chased, or terms of rental, the commission to be paid and the period
during which the agent or broker shall procure a buyer or seller or
tenant, be in writing and be subscribed by the person agreeing to pay
such commission."
See Hale v. Kreisel et al (1927) 194 Wis. 271, 215 N. W. 227, 228:
"The statute was doubtless enacted for reasons similar to those
which led to the enactment of the statute of frauds. It was to pre-
vent frauds and perjuries. Its enforcement will sometimes protect
brokers who have rendered valuable services too little appreciated.
More often it will protect owners from unfounded claims. It will tend
to prevent a flood of litigation arising out of misunderstandings be-
tween well meaning persons. . . . To carry out the legislative intent
we should hold contracts void which do not substantially comply with
the statute. In other words, that the statute means what it says....
To hold that there can be a recovery upon quantum meruit is to 'open
the door to the very abuses the statute was enacted to prevent, and
defeat its manifest purpose'."
4Attempts have also been made to declare such acts unconstitutional
as an interference with due process under the 14th Amendment of the
Federal Constitution or under special state constitutional provisions
which prevent taking a man's services without compensation. But the
Indiana court held that such a statute was constitutional. However,
the court did admit that the statute was in degrogation to the com-
mon law and was to be strictly construed. See Selvage v. Talbott
(1911) 175 Ind. 648, 652, 95 N. E. 114, 116:
". ... before the enactment of this statute numerous suits were in-
stituted .... by agents or brokers who claimed commissions in the sale
2
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Some states have eliminated much of the confusion by in-
eluding in their codes specific provisions, as to "procuring"
prospects instead of the usual "sell or buy" terminology. Thus
the Indiana and the Idaho codes! state, ".... as a commis-
sion or reward for the finding or procuring . . . of a purchaser
of real estate." (italics ours).
What then is the intendment of the Montana legislature in
the enactment of R. C. M. 1935, Section 7519? This is the sec-
tion dealing with the Statute of Frauds and it is sub-paragraph
6 with which we are chiefly concerned. It reads:
"The following contracts are invalid, unless the same,
or some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing and
subscribed by the party to be charged, or his agent:
6. An agreement authorizing or employing an agent
or broker to purchase or sell real estate for compensation or
a commission." (italics ours).
As seen, by the traditional view, ". . . The Statute of
Frauds ordinarily embraces all interests in realty, whether
corporal or incorporal; but it does not extend to agreements
which, although in some manner relating to realty, do not con-
template the transfer of title, ownership, or possession. '" Nor
has Montana any additional code section requiring a contract
to procure to be in writing, or in any other way elaborating on
this subject.
Does this sub-section then, apply only to the case where
the agent or broker has authority actually to pass title to, or
directly effect an interest in, the land or also where he merely
is given authority to procure an. interested party and nego-
tiate a transaction, in which case the owner himself must act-
of land on the grounds that they had been instrumental in procuring
purchasers. .. . and often . . . . there was absolutely no basis for the
claim; on the other hand, brokers and agents complained that owners
when sales were once effected by the agents often after an expenditure
of great effort were given to the repudiation of their honest obligations
• . . Extreme difficulty (was) imposed upon the courts and juries in
ascertaining the truth. . . . The statute was to put an end to such
disputes and to prevent fraud and perjury, and we believe the enact-
ment is well within the police power of the state."
The statute in question is Burn's Ann. Ind. St. 1908, §7463; Burn's
Ann. St. 1-933, §33-104, reads:
"No contract for the payment of any sum of money or thing of value,
as and for a commission or reward for the finding or procuring by one
(1) person of a purchaser of the real estate of another, shall be valid
unless the same shall be in writing .... (italics ours).
5Idaho Code 1932 §16-508 is identical to the Indiana Section in note
4 supra.
637 0.J.S. Frauds, Statute of §69.
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ually close the deal and convey title, i.e., SELL? There can
be little doubt that under general agency law, this latter prop-
osition would be viewed as nothing mote than an authority
for a strictly personal service completely separate and inde-
pendent of any interest in the land.
One of the first problems raised in a study of this question
is the meaning of the key words "purchase and sell." As ordi-
narily used in connection with realty transactions they are
often held not to include the power to convey title. The varied
meanings that are attached to these words under different con-
ditions are well illustrated by the view taken by the American
Law Institute, Restatement of Agency, Section 53, which reads
as follows:
"Authorization 'to buy' or 'to sell' may be interpreted
as meaning that the agent shall:
a. find a seller or purchaser to whom the principal may
buy or sell;
b. make a contract for purchase or sale; or
c. accept or make a conveyance for the principal."
So too, an eminent author on Agency' says:
"The expression, an authority to "sell" land is used
in a viriety of senses:-
1. Merely placing the property in the hands of a real es-
tate broker for sale, or listing it with a real estate agent,
in the ordinary way, is usually held not to amount to
an authority to sell (i.e., to sell and convey . . . .) or
even to make a binding contract to sell. The only au-
thority ordinarily deduced in such cases is simply to
find a purchaser to whom the principal may sell ......
2. The context or the circumstances may show that the
agent was authorized to sell, in the sense of making a
binding contract to sell, even though his authority
would not justify a conveyance ......
3. The agent may be authorized to sell and convey. Such an
authority, where statutes have not changed the rule, us-
ually requires ...... an instrument, e.g., a power of at-
torney, under seal."
Thus, when the owner uses the word "sell" in talking with
a broker, he is normally presumed not to mean to affect the
title or any interest in the land, nor to use it in the same sense
generally intended in the Statute of Frauds. A definition of
the term in keeping with this statutory sense would seem to
'MECHEM, LAW oF AGENCY (3rd Ed. 193) §257, p. 153.
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be that given in Black's Law Dictionary (3rd Ed., 1933) which
says "sell" is to,
"Dispose of by sale," and in turn defines "sale" as a,
"Contract whereby property is transferred from one per-
son to another for a consideration of value, implying pass-
ing of general and absolute title, as distinguished from a
special interest falling short of complete ownership."
The same source says of "purchase":
"The word 'purchase' is used in law in contradis-
tinction to 'descent,' and-means any other mode of acquir-
ing real property than by the common course of inher-
itance...... '
In interpreting this type of statute it is quite clear that
the meaning intended was of the latter type. The statute no
doubt sought to regulate the power to actually convey or pass
title, and not a power merely to negotiate in the sense men-
tioned by Mechem above. If our legislature had intended to
give more power or control than the rather traditional type of
statute, it no doubt would have included words to that effect,
as other states had previously done in incorporating the "pro-
curing" terminology. Since it omitted this very obviously ap-
propriat6 language, it must be assumed that it did so pur-
posely.
As we have seen the courts admit that these statutes are
in derogation of the common law and therefore must be con-
strued strictly. Yet California and Washington, both having
a section identical to R.C.M. 1935, Section 75198 seem to give
'R.C.M. 1935, §7519, sub 6; Cal. Civil Code (1937) (enacted 1872)
§1624, sub 5; Wash. Rem. Rev. Stat. (1932) §5825, sub 5. The open-
ing words of this section are slightly different, reading,
"In the following cases specified in this section, any agreement,
contract or promise shall be void, unless such agreement, contract
or promise .......
The words "purchase and sell" in the sub-section are in reverse order
to those in the California and Montana Sections.
Also nearly identical are Ore. Comp. Law (1939) §2-909, sub 8 and
Arizona A.R.A. 1939, §58-101, sub 7, reading,
"Upon an agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker
to purchase or sell real property, or mines, for compensation or a
commission."
The legislative history of subdivision 6, R.C.M. 1935, §7519, may be
thought to support in some measure the contention that the legislature
intended that is should extend to al brokerage contracts relating in
any way to land, rather than only to those intending to grant a power
to deal directly with the title. It seems to have been enacted inde-
pendently of and subsequent to the bulk of the Section by the Cali-
fornia legislature (though it was adopted by Montana in 1895 as an
integral part of the Section). Early California cases apparently as-
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a very loose and broad meaning to these technical words, and
reach a result similar to that under the Idaho or Indiana stat-
ute which specifically includes the term, "procuring a pur-
chaser." Let us view some of these decisions.
The length to which the courts have gone in preventing
recovery under this statute is well illustrated by a recent Cal-
ifornia case* where the court held a demurrer to seven sep-
arate pleas by way of estoppel against the statute was prop-
erly sustained and a recovery of commission barred. The
court said,
"These are the oral promise to pay the commission,
payment for similar services under previous oral contracts,
a mutual relation of trust and confidence because of these
prior transactions, plaintiffs' belief induced by this prior
conduct that the statute would not be invoked, reliance, in-
jury, and defendants' knowledge of all these circumstan-
ces ..... It would seem manifest that if this contract was
unenforceable because of the statute of frauds no part of
it could be enforced indirectly by a suit for the reason-
able value of time or money laid out under the contract."
The fact that the court fails to differentiate between the
"purchase and sell" statute such as ours, and the "procuring
a purchaser" statute such as Indiana or Idaho, appears in the
case of Kieth et al vs. Smith et al in Washington."
Here the defendant sent the plaintiff this letter.
"Enclosed 'find contract, which Mr. Smith wishes
signed by Mr. Fletcher and confirmed by Rice and wife.
Advise us when the abstract is ready, and we will come
over at once."
All the references were understood by the parties. The plain-
tiff negotiated the purchase of land that was later ratified by
the 'defendant and the defendant actually purchased it him-
self, making payments through the plaintiff. Plaintiff's serv-
ices were found to be worth $1250 but the trial court sustained
the defendant's demurrer. The Supreme Court approved, say-
ing:
"We think the reasoning of the Indiana court may
well be applied to the allegations of the complaint in this
sume that it so extends to all such contracts without giving any rea-
son therefor. So the source of such conclusion is not apparent in the
cases. It is submitted that, in view of the meaning generally given
to the words "sell" and "purchase," in general Statutes of Frauds, to
so extend it is a doubtful form of judicial legislating.
'White v. Hirschman et al (1942) 54 C. A. (2d) 573, 129 P. (2d) 430, 431.
'°(1907) 46 Wash. 131, 89 P. 473, 475.
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action, and that the note or memorandum therein set forth
is utterly insufficient to constitute a compliance with our
statute."
The Washington court was referring to the case of Zimmerman
vs. Zehender" which was decided under the very different In-
diana "procuring" statute already noted but the Washington
court apparently didn't consider the fact that its legislature
had never seen fit to pass such an act and the court now prac-
tically adopted it by judicial action.
The better reasoning would seem to be with the broker,
where he isn't himself passing title, unless the statute un-
equivocally denies recovery for services in procuring or nego-
tiating with prospects. Nor is there any more danger of per-
jury or fraud in this field than there is in the sale of chattels,
securities or any other property. Indeed, any fraud present
seems to be that of the owner in accepting his agent's services
and then hiding behind the statute to deny his agreed com-
pensation.
While the Montana court has dealt with various shades of
the problem, it appears that the precise question of a broker
contracting merely to produce a prospect ready, willing and
able to buy or sell at given terms for a commission orally
agreed upon with the principal, has not arisen. RCM 1935,
Section 7519 (or its predecessor, Civil Code 1895, Section 2185)
has been frequently considered and, it would seem, with con-
siderable confusion. The Montana Court had cause as early
as 1899" to interpret this section, when it said,
"No matter what services were rendered to defendant
... and accepted by defendant, no recovery can be had for
them, under the proof of this record, because there was no
memorandum of any contract for such services in writing.
(Civil Code, Sec. 2185)."
In a 1906 case" where there was a written authority to sell
within a year, the defendant tried to terminate the agency by
a note, unless sold within 30 days at a smaller price. The plain-
tiff admitted this writing but alleged the understanding was
that the 30 days applied only to the reduced price and that
thereafter the original agreement should continue in force.
The court held for the plaintiff and stated that whether the
1(1905) 164 Ind. 465, 73 N.E. 920.,
12King v. Benson 22 Mont. 256, 258, 56 P. 280, 281. See also Marshall
v. Trerise 33 Mont. 28, 81 P. 400.
'"Blankenship et al v. Decker et al 34 Mont. 292, 298, 85 P. 1035, 1037.
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contract was in writing or not was a matter of proof, not alle-
gation for pleading. It went on in dictum to say:
" ..... and upon a complete performance of an express
contract for services at a stipulated compensation, there
seems to be no sound reason why a recovery may not be had
upon the quantum meruit."
The court seems to suggest, although probably as dictum,
that performance may take the agreement out of the statute.
To the same effect is the case of Cobb v. Warren." Here the
plaintiff agreed in an ordinary brokerage contract in writing to
take all over $35 per acre as a commission for finding a purchas-
er for defendant's land. Later they agreed orally to sell at $30
net, and the defendant did sell at $32 and the plaintiff claims
the $2 per acre as commission. The judgment for the plaintiff
was reversed and remanded for a new trial for insufficient evi-
dence because the plaintiff had failed to sustain the burden of
proof that he was the procuring cause of the sale. The court
said:
"A writing being necessary in the first instance as a
basis of recovery, where there is a subsequent change of
terms agreed upon it must also be reduced to writing, so
long as unexecuted. But in this case plaintiff bases his
right of recovery upon an executed agreement modifying
the original written contract. He had right of recovery on
this theory in the event he was able to establish the modi-
fication either "by a contract in writing, or by an executed
oral agreement, and not otherwise." (R. C. M. 1921, Section
7569)."
Again the court apparently indicates the case might be tak-
en out of the statute and seems to lay down the test as to wheth-
er or not the broker could recover his commission, at least from
the dictum, to be whether the oral contract (or modification)
was executed or executory.
The cases in Montana seem to be divided into two rather
distinct lines. First, the ones just considered, indicating by
dictum at least, thatt recovery might be had either under quan-
tum meruit or if the oral agreement is executed. Second, in
the later cases, from about 1925 on, the court takes quite an op-
posite view and allows recovery on no grounds whatsoever if the
agreement is not fully reduced to writing. So in Skinner v. Red
Lodge Brewing Co.' there was an action for a commission on
14(1922) 64 Mont. 10, 18, 208 P. 928, 930.
"(1927) 79 Mont. 292, 296, 256 P. 173, 175.
8
Montana Law Review, Vol. 7 [1946], Iss. 1, Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol7/iss1/10
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
quantum meruit theory. One stockholder of the Brewing Co.
had written another a letter which was shown to the plaintiff,
stating an opinion of several of the stockholders as to the price
at which the defendant corporation might sell its property, the
commissions, etc. While the court determined against the plain-
tiff on the grounds that the letter in question was neither ad-
dressed to him nor sent by the defendant corporation, it went on
to say that R.C.M. 1935, Section 7519, was mandatory and that,
"Pursuant to this express statutory requirement, the
law is settled by repeated decisions that a brokerage con-
tract for the sale of real estate in this state must be in writ-
ing and subscribed by the party to be charged, or his author-
ized agent, in order to permit a broker to recover compen-
sation or a commission on the sale of real estate by the
owner."'
However, the court appears quite willing to allow recover-
ies for commissions in oral agreements to secure a lease or op-
tion, since it feels that no interest in the land is affected. This
view is shown in the Kramer case.1' Here the plaintiff orally
agreed to secure an assignment of an option contract held by a
third person to buy land at $20 per acre, and he was to get a
commission of one dollar per acre. The court held:
"The holder of the option, then, acquires nothing but a
personal privilege to purchase, which does not ripen into an
interest in the land until he chooses to exercise the privilege
conferred by the option and complies with the terms unon
which he obtained it ..... Awbery (the third person) hav-
ing acquired no interest in the land, but a mere personal
privilege which he could lawfully assign to the defendant,
the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant did
not amount to an employment of the former as a broker or
agent to buy land or an interest in land which by the statute
is required to be in writing, but to an engagement by him
to perform a service which could be lawfully made by oral
contract. "
Again in the same year in a companion case" to the Cobb
case supra, involving the same transaction, the court said:
"The statute of frauds has no application in this case,
as the agreement alleged was one to be performed within
one year, and it is not an agreement authorizing or employ-
ing an agent or broker to purchase or sell real estate within
"
6See also Dick v. King (1925) 73 Mont. 456, 236 P. 1093.
"Kramer v. Schmidt (1922) 62 Mont. 568, 572, 206 P. 620, 621.
"Awberry v. Schmidt (1922) 65 Mont. 265, 274, 211 P. 346, 348.
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the meaning of Section 7519 R.C.M. 1921, but rather an oral
contract to divide commission on the sale of the lands cov-
ered by the written option contract from Bain to Awbery.
The plaintiff did not contract to sell real estate to the de-
fendant, but rather assigned his right to make purchase of
real estate under an option contract, and, as the contract
between the plaintiff and the defendant was to be per-
formed within a year, no writing was necessary."
The court went on to quote from an early Montana case" ap-
provingly:
"Under this definition the holder of the option is not
vested with any interest in the land, but, as said by Mr.
Justice DeWitt, he gets 'in praesenti, not lands, or an agree-
ment that he shall have lands, but he does get something of
value, that is, the right to call for and receive lands as he
elects'."
Here as in the Cobb case, however, the decision turned on
the insufficiency of the evidence that the plaintiff was a pro-
curing cause. Thus, it seems clear that the court would allow
recovery of a commission where the agent finds an optionee, even
though that optionee may immediately exercise his option and
"buy," i.e., receive title, because the option itself is not an in-
terest in lands. But on the other horn of this dilemma, it is
difficult to see how any interest in land can be affected by such
a purely personal service as ferreting out prospects, and nego-
tiating with them, but neither having the power, nor attempt-
ing to exercise such a power, as affecting the title to the land
in any way. Therefore, to maintain any consistency, both prop-
ositions must either be within, or both without, the statute. To
allow recovery of a commission in one case, but deny it in the
other, is indeed a paradox.
T'his anomaly is probably most clearly shown in the case of
O'Niel v. Wall in 1936,' and we may profit by considering it at
greater length. Here the plaintiff orally agreed to induce one
of four interested parties to enter into a lease or option OR a
lease and option with the defendant regarding certain mining
properties, on these terms; $25,000 down, $15,000 in six months,
$35,000 six months later, and $50,000 at the end of the 18 month
period. The plaintiff was successful in securing one of these
parties, Schmidt, who entered into a contract whereby defendant
agreed to sell and Schmidt agreed to buy the mining property
in question with the payments conforming in amount and date
"Ide v. Leiser (1891) 10 Mont. 5, 24 Am. St. Rep. 17, 24 P. 695.
"103 Mont. 388 62 P. (2d) 672.
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as testified by plaintiff. The defendant pleaded sub-division
6 of R.C.M. 1935, Section 7519, as a bar but the lower court
gave judgment of $5,000 for the plaintiff which the Supreme
Court affirmed, holding that it was definitely decided in the
Kramer case that,
"It will be noted that the statute relates to the purchase
or sale of real estate. It was definitely decided by this court
in the case of Kramer v. Schmidt .... that a contract to
secure an option need not be in writing. Since the holder
of an option acquires nothing but a personal privilege to
purchase, which does not ripen into an interest in land until
he chooses to exercise the privilege conferred by the option
and complies with the terms on which he purchased it, an
agreement employing a broker to procure or negotiate an op-
tion does not amount to an employment of a broker or agent
to buy or sell an interest in land.'
The court went on to say:
"Thus it appears that a lease is not real estate, and ac-
cordingly a broker's contract to procure or sell a lease is not
within the statute and need not be in writing. The contract
which was entered into by the defendant was an agreement
to sell and purchase real estate, but such an agreement does
not amount to a sale of real estate. It is an executory agree-
ment which would become a sale of real estate when fully
performed, that is, when all of the payments have been made.
... The contract sued on was not required to be in writing
by the statute pleaded. "
Even more astounding than the anomaly mentioned above,
is the court's proposition that a lease, which plaintiff had au-
thority to give, is not an interest in land for this purpose al-
though sub-division 5 of R.C.M. 1935, Section 7519 specifically
requires that "an agreement for leasing for a longer period than
one year" be in writing."
So the court seems to have adopted two different views of
"Ibid at 391.
0Ibid at 392.
"Roscow v. Bora (1943) 114 Mont. 246, 254, 135 P. (2d) 364, 366.
This case may be thought to reject the O'Neil rule that a lease-
hold is not an interest in land under the'Statute of Frauds. At least
it presents an interesting converse to the O'Niel case and seems to bear
out the inconsistency mentioned above. Here plaintiff had a written
agreement to get 10% commission for procuring a purchaser for min-
ing lands for not less than $100,000. Instead plaintiff secured a lease
and option which was later terminated for a straight lease. The
court affirmed the judgment for the defendant, stating,
" .... the words, 'procure a purchaser' can mean but one thing-
procuring a person who will buy the property. Likewise, the writ-
ten contract being clear, we cannot say that the plaintiff's services,
11
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R.C.M. 1935, Section 7519. If this section refers only to au-
thority in an agent to deal directly with the title, then clearly
any authority not including a power to affect the title directly
is not covered by the mandate that it be in writing. Under this
interpretation the court would correctly exclude authorities to
give a mere option. On the other hand, if the object of this sec-
tion is so sweeping as to interdict all brokerage authorities not
in writing, simply to prevent disputes, it doesn't matter wheth-
er the authority extends to a dealing directly wihin the statute
or not.
Thus it appears there is considerable confusion in the pres-
ent state of the law on this question. The court seems to strain
unnecessarily in arriving at the result that a lease or option does
not amount to an interest in land so as to allow recovery, when
it could have frankly based the same result on the obvious fact
that the mere finding of a prospect does not affect any interest
in the land what-so-ever. Even though the doctrine of this case
in saying that a lease-hold is not an interest in land under the
Statute of Frauds is unacceptable, the case seems really to sup-
port the conclusion that the agent should be allowed to recover
his commission where the agreement is simply to find a prospect
and no interest whatever in the land is involved in the agents
authority. Further, so much dictum present in some Montana
decisions seems to favor the broker's recovery where the oral
agreement is to find a prospect, that the court would seem jus-
tified in carefully construing the terms "purchase and sell" of
this Section so as to allow recovery where the oral agreement is
merely to find a prospect ready, willing and abje to buy, where
he conveys no interest in the land, and doesn't even consum-
mate a lease or option. Nor is any property right involved to
preclude a clear adoption of such a view.
It is submitted that the court should carefully consider the
wording of our Section, if the proper case arises, and not read
into it the words of the Indiana or Idaho section which our leg-
islature has never seen fit to include. Since this statute is ad-
mittedly in derogation to the common law, no more should be
read into it than was clearly intended by the legislature as
shown by its words. Under these circumstances, it is hoped that
the section will not be so stretched as to preclude the recovery
of the broker's commission. Orville Gray.
when the terms of the contract were not met, entitle her to a com-
mission."
Therefore, the court denies plaintiff recovery of commisssion on the
very point which in the O'Niel case it allowed recovery, because there
it found that a "lease" is not an "interest" in land and agreements
relating to it need not be In writing.
12
Montana Law Review, Vol. 7 [1946], Iss. 1, Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol7/iss1/10
